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RECENT CASES.
APPEAL AND ERRoR-DIsPOSITION OF CAUsE-RFVF.RSAi--AM01INT OF
DAMAGES-In an action to recover compensation for damage done to land
by a flood, the lower court dismissed the action. On the appeal it was
argued that even if the plaintiff had made out a prina facie case he was
not entitled to have the order reversed because he had failed to prove any
damage. Held: Though there was no proof of the amount of the damages
because of a misconception of ihe measure, as the evidence showed sub-
stantial damages a-new trial should be ordered. Erickson v. Minnesota &
Ontario Power Company, 1S8 N. W. 979 (Minn. i916).
This case represents one of the limitations to the general rule that
a judgment will not be reversed and a new trial granted simply to permit
the recovery of nominal damages. Thisler v. Hopkins, 85 Ill. App. 207
(1889); Lyons v. Smith, 36 App. Div. 627 (N. Y. 1898); McLean v. Charles
Wright Medicine Co., 56 N. W. 68 (Mich. 1893). The general rule which
has its basis in the doctrine of de rnumnis non curat lex will not be followed
where as in the principal case the evidence shows that substantial injury
has been suffered or where there has been a positive and wrongful invasion
of another's rights. Ashby v. White, 2d Ld. Raym. 938 (1703); Wartman
v. Swindell, 18 L. R. A. 44 (N. J. 1892); Thomson-Houston Elect. Co. v.
Durant Land Co, x44 N. Y. 34 (1894); Harvey v. Mason City & Fort Dodge
R. R. Co., io5 N. W. 958 (Iowa igo6)."
In cases where a judgment for nominal damages would carry the costs, a
new trial will be granted. Chambers v. Frazier, 29 Ohio St. 362 (x876); Mid-
dleton v. Jerdee, 73 Wis. 39 (1888). It has been held, also, that while a court
would refuse to reverse a judgment denying a new trial simply to allow a
plaintiff an opportunity to recover nominal damages, such a rule would not be
applied to the granting of a ndnsuit when the plaintiff was entitled to recover
nominal damages. Bloom v. Americus Grocery Co., 43 S. E. 54 (Ga. i9o2).
The failure of a jury, however, to award nominal damages in an action of
libel per se is not ground for reversal. Fink v. Evening Post Pub. to.
46 N. E. 292 (N. Y. 1897); Tracey v. Hackett, 49 N., E. 185 (Ind. 1898).
But see contra, Von Schoeder v. Spreckels, 147 Cal. 86 (i9o5).
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-FEEs-SETTLEMENT OF LITIGATION BY CLIENT-
An attorney was retaiced to prosepte a ,pipt for. a cQottingent- fee. After
the client had compromised with his opponent, without the attorney's con-
sent, the attorney sued for the contract price. Held: The attorney cannot
recover upon the express contract, though that will not bar recovery, on a
quantum inerut, for the value of services rendered before the settlement.
Southworth et al. v. Rosendahl, i58-N. W. Rep. 717 (i916).
Where the compensation depends on the success of the attorney, and
the client, in good faith, settles with his adversary, in the opinion of- some
courts, the attorney is confined to a recovery of the reasonable value of the
services to the time of the settlement, Quint v. Opher Silver Min. Co, 4
Nev. 304 (1868); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Semmes, 73 Md. 9 (x89o);
Harris v. Root, 28 Mont. 159 (19o3), even though there is a provision that
(as)
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he client shall not compromise without the attorney's consent. It has been
held that the attorney cannot recover the specified sum under the contract,
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Semmes, 73 Md. 9 (189o) ; Harris v. Root, supra,
for it is invalid. He cannot be compelled to accept the contingent fee, but
may sue in quantuz recruit. Duke v. Harper, 8 Mo. App. 296 (i88o). But
if the contract fixes the amount which the attorney is to receive in case
of settlement, with or without his consent, he can recover on that contract.
Elliott v. Rubel, 132 Ill. 9 (89o).
Another line of cases holds that, if the client has thus compromised,
the attorney may recover the compensation as agreed in the contract, just as
if he had succeeded in the suit, the theory being that the client has pre-
vented performance and thereby waived it. Hill v Cunningham, 25 Tex. 25
(i86o) ; Millard v. Jordan, 76 Mich. 13x (1889) ; Bogert v. Adams, .8 Colo.
App. 185 (x896). In those states, where a provision that a client shall not
compromise a suit is valid, the attorney can recover the' contract price.
Ryan v. Martin, 16 Wis. 59 (r862); Hoffman v. Vallejo, 45 Cal. 564 (1872).
ATTORNEY AND CLIFNT-SCOPE OF AUTHORITY-A county moved to set
aside a verdict founded on an agreed statement of facts signed by the
county attorney, on the ground that it amounted to a confession of judg-
ment, and was therefore outside the attorney's authoiity. Held: The
signing was within the agent's implied authority. Christy v. Atchison T.
& S.:F. R. R., 233 Fed. 255 (CoL 1916).
The weight of authority is that an attorney can confess judginent and
the client is bound. Franigan v. Philadelphia, 5x Pa. 491 (1866); Thompson
v. Pershing, 86 Ind. 303 (1882); Hollenbeck v. Glover, 128 Ga. 52 (1907).
Contra: Price v. Logue, 164 S. W. io48 (Texas 194); Kilmer v. Gallaher,
112 o16wa 583 (igoo). When the confession is made because of the attor-
neys personal malice, it is not binding, Nichells v. Nichells, 5 N. D. 125
nor when made on behalf of infant clients, the attorney at the
sani" time representing .adverse interests. Walker v. Grayson, 86 Va. 337
..-In general, the authority of counsel extends to all customary incidents
of litigation short of a compromise of client's claim, Combs v. Combs, Ios
N. E. 944 (Ind. 1914), and the client cannot interfere. Board of Com-
missioners v. Younger, 29 Cal. 147 (1865). The attorney may do ill the
mechanical acts of litigation, Wright v. Parks, io Iowa 342 (786o); Bing-
ham v. Board of Supervisors, 6 Minn. 136 (1861); Lacoste v. *Eastland,
117 Cal. 673 (1897), waive technicalities, Hefferman v. Burt, 7 Iowa 320,
submit to a nonsuit, Lynch v. Cowell, 12 L. T. 548 (1865), or admit facts
for the purposes of trial. . U. S. to use Lyman Coal Co. v. U. S.. Fidelity
and Guaranty Co.. 8. Vt. 278 (oi0o).
It is not part of an attorney's implied authority to accept service of
original process, Reed v. Reed, 19 S. C. 548 (j883), when to do so will
bring his client within the jurisdiction of the court, nor to stipulate that
the dismissal of an action shall bar an action for malicious prosecution,
Marbourg v. Smith, it Kan. 544 (1873), nor to stipulate not to appeal,
Keoughan v. Equitable Oil Co., ;i5 La. 773 (xgo6), nor to release the
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property of the defendant from a judgment lien, Phillips v. Dobbins, 56 GA
617 (1876), nor to appeal the case, Hooker v. Brandon, 75 Wis. 8 (1889),
nor to submit matter to arbitration without a rule of court. Markley v.
Amos, 8 Rich. 468 (S. C. 1832).
As counsel has control of the remedy,' he has implied authority to
issue execution on the judgment, Bank of Georgetown v. Geary, 30 U. S.
99 (D. C. x83), and to cause the defendant to be confined in jail. Hyam
v. Michel, 3 Rich. Law 3o3 (S. C. 1832). His implied powers extend to
vacating a judgment which is pending on appeal. Quin v. Doyd, 3o N. Y.
Super. 538 (1868). After judgment and during the time that a writ of
error can be sued out, he can stipulate that the judgment in his suit shall
abide the decision of another suit involving the same questions and tried
by the same attorneys. Brown v. Arnold, 131 Fed. 723 (Mo. 1904).
Counsel cannot delegate his discretionary powers, Eggleston v. Board-
man, 37 Mich. 14 (1877), nor employ other counsel to aid him without
express authority, Emblem v. Bicksler, 34 Colo. 496 (i9o5), but he can
delegate ministerial duties and bind his client to pay. McEwen v. Mazyck
and Bell, 3 Rich. L. 210 (S. C. 1889).
Notice to the attorney is notice tq the client, Sweeney v. Pratt, 7o
Conn. 274 (1897).; Mitchell v. Morgan, 165 S. W. 883 (Texas 1914), and
an attorney's admission as such binds the client. Pratt v. Conway, t48 Mo.
291 (x899); Citizens Savings Bank v. Fitchburg Fire Ins. Co., 86 AtL ioS6
(Vt. 1913). He can receive payment of a judgment, Carrol County v.
Cheatham, 48 Mo. 38s (1870.
CoNFLiCc or LAWS-USURY-CONTRACTS SECURED ON LAND--A borrower
of money executed notes, payable in Illinois at the rate of 8 per cent.,,
secured under provisions of the Georgia code relative to deeds to secure
debts in that state, the security deed stipulating that it should be a Georgia
contract. Held: The interest laws of Georgia applied. Harvard v. Davis,
89 S. E. 740 (Ga. zgr6).
Most courts are agreed that as to contracts made in one place to be
performed in another, the lex -Ioci solutionis governs. Miller v. Tiffany, I
Wallace 31o (U. S. 1863); Ringer v. Virgin Timber Co., 213 Fed. ioo2
(1914); Gold Stabeck Loan & Credit Co. v. Kinney, 157 N. W. 482 (N. D.
191&). Nevertheless, it has always been the rule that parties may contract
with a view to the law of a particular state, Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33
(x842); Jenkins v. Union Savings Ass'n, 155 N. W. 765 (Minn. 1916); and
it was on this basis that the principal case was decided.
Where a loan is secured by land, the locus rei siae is the place of
performance within the rule, in the absence of provisions as to the place
of payment, First National Bank v. Rambo; 85 S. E. 84o (Ga. 1915), but
where the land is situated in one state and payment is to be made in
another, the laws of the jurisdiction where payment is to be made, control.
Ringer v. Virgin Timber Co. and Jenkins v. Union Saving Ass'n, supr..
CONTACrS-ILLEGAL CoNsim)EATioN-In an action by a justice of the
peace to collect costs, the defendant set up an agreement made with the
justice who entered up the judgments, which provided that the costs, in case
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a recovery was had, were to be collected at all events, from the other
party to the judgment. feld: That the contract was illegal and void, being
opposed to public policy, and the due administration of justice. Southern
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Mitchell, 89 S. E. 514 (Georgia pig6).
It is a well settled rule that any contract by one acting in a public
capacity which restricts the free exercise of a discretion vested in him for
the public good is void. Willemin v. Bates, 63 Mich. 309 (1886); Hawkeye
Insurance Co. v. Brainard, 72 Iowa i3o (1887); Brown v. First National
Bank, 137 Ind. 655 (1893). Contracts founded on a consideration contrary
to the sound principles of public policy will not be enforced. Marshall v.
B. & 0. R. R. Co., 16 Howard 314 (U. S. i83); Walsh v. Hibberd, 122
Md. 168 (1913); Standard Fashion Co. v. Grant, i65 N. C. 453 (i914).
the law looks to the general tendency of such agreements, and it closes
the door to temptation by refusing them recognition in any of the courts
of the country. The good faith of the parties is immaterial. Elkhart
County Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ihd. 242 (1884) ; Woodstock Iron Co. v. Rich-
mond and Danville Extension Co., 129 U. S. 163 (1888). If the contract
has not been executed, it will not be enforced; if it has been executed, the
law will not give relief. It cannot be rendered valid by invoking* the
doctrine of estoppel. The law will treat the parties as in pari delicto, and
leave them where they have placed themselves. Hutchins v. Weldon, 114
Ind. 8o (1887); Robinson v. Patterson, 71 Mich. 141 (1888); Gilchrist v.
Hatch, io6 N. E. 96 (Ind. 1914).
CRIMINAL LAW-CONFESSION-VOLUNTARY CHARAcrER-After a prisoner
suggested that he would "come out and tell the truth," the officer that
effected the arrest, said, "It is always best to tell the truth." A confession
subsequently made was admitted in evidence. Held: The confession was
properly. admitted. People v. Wilkinson, 198 Pac. io6 (Cal. x916).
According to the better view the confession in the principal case would
have been admissible even if the first suggestion had not come from the
prisoner himself. Rex v. Court, V C. & P. 486 (Eng. 1836) ; State v. King,
4o Ala. 321 (867). But see contra, Com. v. Myers, i6o Mass. 53o (1894),
where the confession was excluded because the officer merely advised the
prisoner that he had better tell the truth. The rule against the admission
of confessions unless they are voluntary is founded upon the idea that
they are testimonially untrustworthy, and not upon any idea that a wrong
would be done the accused in admitting them. Com. v. Dillon, 4 Dal. 116
(Pa. 1792) ; Regina v. Mansfield, 14 Cox. Cr. 639 (Eig. i88r). The test has
accordingly been held to be whether the inducement held out to the prisoner
was calculated to make his confession an untrue one. Rex v. Thomas,
7 C. & P. 346 (1836); Tife v. Com, 29 Pa. 437 (1837); U. S. v. Stone, 8
Fed. 232 (i8gx).
CRIMINAL LAW-MANSLAUCHTER-FAILkE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL ATTEND-
ANCE FOR CHIL--The father of a five-months-old child, knowing that the
child was dangerously ill, refused to provide medical attendance for it,
under the belief that prayer was all that was necessary; and in pursuance
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of this belief he did resort to prayer by himself and others for the child's
recovery. The child died. Held: The father might be convicted of invol-
untary manslaughter; verdict, guilty. Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. C. C.
56 (1916).
The court applied the familiar principle that religious conviction is
no excuse for a violation of the law of the land. Perhaps the best example
of this principle is shown in the Mormon cases, holding that the practice
of polygamy under a religious belief in its necessity is not excusable.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878). So also, working on
Sunday, contrary to the statute compelling the observance of Sunday rest.
when it was believed that Saturday was the true Lord's day and it was
wrong to refrain from work on any other. Speht v. Comm., 8 Pa. 312
(1848), and playing, without a police license, on a musical instrument in
a street parade, although done as a matter of religious worship only. Comm.
v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375 (1889).
The father of an infant child owes him the duty of maintenance and
of providing him with the necessities of life, which includes reasonable
medical attendance in time of illness; a violation of this duty imposed by
law may amount to gross and culpable neglect, and if it results in death,
he may be convicted of- involuntary manslaughter. Regina v. Dowries, 13
Cox C. C. xx (Eng. 1875); Regina v. Senior, 19 Cox C. C. 219 (Eng. 1898);
People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 20x (9093); State v. Chenowith, 163 Ind. 94
(Igo4). On the same state of facts as in the priintiipal case, a conviction
of involuntary manslaughter was had in Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 29 Pa.
C. C. 65 (19o3).
DEBT-SHERIFFS AuEZmEcN--Nax.sc Or DuTl-A sheriff, by statu-
tory provision, who failed to return a writ of execution within the proper
time. could be amerced in the amount of said debt. damages and costs with
ten per cent. Held: A showing of, or lack of, damages, i a proceeding
thereunder was irrelevant and unnecessary. Lee v. Dolan, t58 N. W. loo7
(N. D. i9x6).
An amercement. strictly speaking, is a penalty and is a fixed sum, without
regard to the extent of the injury suffered by the complaining party, by
reason 9f the default for which it is imposed. 35 Cyc., p. 1885. When
the statute is of a penal character, positive and peremptory in imposing an
absolute liability, the court has no discretion, but it is their duty to amerce"
the sheriff, whether his omission results from wilful wrong, or mere neglect,
and whether actual damage has been suffered or not. Graham v. Newton,
12 Ohio 210 (1843); Smith v. Martin, 2o Kans. 572 (1878); Cox v. Ploss, 56
Miss. 481 (1879); Henderson-Stuirgis Piano Co. v. Smith, 33 Okla. 335
(1912). Some statutes impose a fixed fine, irrespective of the amount of
the execution debt, which the courts of those *states have rigorously imposed,
without the power to dispense or relieve. Brewer v. Elder, 33 Minn. z47
(885) ; Swain v. Phelps, 125 N. C. 43 (x899). Other courts on the con-
trary, construe practically similar statutes to be penal, only when the conduct
of the sheriff is shown to have been wilful or corrupt. Shufeldt Co. v.
Barlass, 33 Neb. 785 (1892); Allen v. Christensen, x27 N. W. 185 (Minn.
i9io). Those courts which require actual damage to entitle the plaintiff
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to recover the penalty, place the burden of proof on the sheriff to excuse his
failure, and show that he could not have collected anything, had he executed
the writ. Coffey v. Wilson, 65 Ia. 27o (1884); Waxahachie Nursery Co. v.
Sansom, 138 S. W. 422 (Tex. 1911). So where the judgment debtor had
no property liable to execution, no action lay against the sheriff. Swenson
v. Christoferson, 72 N. W. 459 (S. D. x897); Planken v. Jones, 53 S.
W. 583 (Tex. igxi).
In Pennsylvania it has been held that it is immaterial that there are
no goods on which to levy. Bachman v. Fenstermacher, 112 Pa. 331 (1886).
A very few courts draw a distinction between an officer's failure to levy,
and a failure to make a return within the specified time, holding that "be-
cause of the highly penal character of the statute, its terms should not be
extended by construction to cases not within its plain meaning." And there-
fore the ten per cent. penalty should never be enforced in any case where
the execution has been returned, although after the proper date. Bond v.
Weber, 17 Kan. 410 (877); Hawkins v. Taylor, !6 Ark. 45 (x89a).
FRAUD--ELEMENTS-RECKLESS STATEMENTs-A vendor in inducing the
purchase of a tract of land innocently misrepresented the number" of acres.
Held: Honesty of belief is not a defense in an action for fraud. -Schlechter
v. Felton, x58 N. W. 813 (Minn. 1916).
The principal case is opposed to the doctrine of Peek v. Derry, 14
Appeal Cases 337 (Eng. 1889), that there must be actual fraud and not
merely gross negligence. Under this view the plaintiff must prove scienter,
or its equivalent. Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241 (1889); Griswold v. Gebbie,
126 Pa. 353 (1889); Colorado Springs Co. v. Wright, 44 Col. 179 (19o8);
Snyder v. Hemmons, 157 Mo. App. i56 (xgxo). It has been held that this
scienter may be proved by showing that the assertion was made as of the
defendant's own knowledge so unqualifiedly that it implies actual knowledge.
Cabot v. Christie, 42 Vt. 121 (x869); Watson v. Jones, supra; Snyder v.
Hemm-ons, supra; but in Pennsylvania such proof would be only prima facie
evidence of deceit. Griswold v. Gebbie, supra.
One negotiating a trade, is held, by some courts, bound to know and
cannot assert to be true that which he does not know. Prestwood v. Carl-
ton, 162 Ala. 327 (i9o9); Katham v. Comstock, 140 Wis. 427 (1909). He
cannot, by his recklessness, cast upon the vendee the .duty of measuring the
land, but the latter may rely on the former's statements. Ledbetter v. Davis,
121 Ind. 1i9 (1889); Selby v. Matson, 137 Ia. 97 (x9o8); Wasterman v.
Corder, 86 Kan. 239 (1912). In most states the vendor is liable even though
he has pointed out the boundaries, Ledbetter v. Davis, supra; Griswold v.
Gebbie, supra, though it has been held that the duty of inspection rests on
the vendee. Gordon v. Paripelee, 2 Allen 212 (Mass. 186i). A few juris-
dictions hold the declarant liable even though the representation is entirely
innocent, if he is a party to the contract. Aldrich v. Scribner, x54 Mich.
23 (1908).'
EVIDENCE-WITE OF ACCOMPICuE-CORROBORATiGN-In a prosecution for
larceny the evidence of one of the several accomplices was corroborated by
the wife of another accomplice who was not called. The wife was in no
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way connected with the crime. Held: The evidence was admissible as cor-
roboration despite the fact that it in turn was not corroborated by an inde-
pendent witness. Rex v. Willis, 1i4 L. T. 1o47 (Eng. i9io).
The general rule regarding the testimonial source of the corroboration
necessary to the evidence of an accomplice is, that it must be independent
of the accomplice himself, and must rest on other than his credit. Hannehan
v. State, 7 Tex. App. 664 (183o). Although it was formerly the rule in
England, that the testimony of an accomplice's wife is insufficient, Rex v.
Neal, 7 C. & P. x68 (Eng. 1835), the contrary is the rule in the majority of
the states authorities and as shown in the principal case, is the modem
English view. Rex v. Wilson, 6 C. A. R. 125 (Eng. 1911); Rex v. Blather-
wick, 6 C. A. R. 281 (Eng. 1911); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa x28 (x868);
Woods v. State, 76 Ala. 35 (1884). In no jurisdiction is the testimony of
an accomplice alone sufficient. Rex v. ,Noates, s C. & P. 526 (Eng. 1832) ;
Porter v. Com., 6x S. W. 16 (Ky. xgoi). Peculiar circumstances mq-y,
however, render it sufficient in certain cases, as where the prisoners have
been separately confined, Rex v. Aylmer, x Cr. & D. 1i6 (Eng. i839), or
have had "no opportunity of being together to prepare a uniform story,"
State v. Williamson, 42 Conn. 261 (x875). The sufficiency of the corrobora-
tion is for the jury, but its existence is a question of law for the court.
People v. O'Farrell, 175 N. Y. 323 (19o3); Stone v. State, 45 S. E. 630 (Ga.
1903).
LIBEL-FAIR CommENT-A newspaper published a report of a meeting
of the school board at which it appeared that the contractor's estimates for
enlargements were double those of the board's architect who had an ex-
clusive riglit to design the enlargements. The comment was that "the
rule is an absurdity and puts a premium upon a certain kind of advice."
Held: The criticism is only on the architect 'as a public servant and as
such is not libellous. Leng & Co. v. Langlands, 114 Law Times 665 (Eng.
1916).
The right of newspapers and the public generally to criticize and com-
ment upon matters of public interest and the conduct of public officers is
generally conceded, both in England and America. Henwood v. Harrison,
L R. 7 C. P. 6o6 (Eng. 1872); Miner v. Detroit Post & Tribune Co., 49 Mich.
358 (1882) ; Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Co, 24i Mo. 320 (1912) ; Ott v. Mur-
phy, 141 N. W. 463 (Iowa 1913). The right does not include the making
of statements, otherwise libelous, ii App. Cases 187 (Eng, 1886); Neet
v. Hope, iII Pa. 145 (1886); Burt.v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., x54 Mass.
238 (1891); Hallam v. Post Publishing Co., 55 Fed. 456 (1893), nor can the
publisher escape liability if his comment was in fact malicious, and made
merely for the purpose of injuring the one about whom the comments are
made. Henwood v. Harrison, supra; Malone v. Carrico, 16 Ky. Law Rep.
155 (184). So also, comment on the private character of public men, ex-
cept as it affects their fitness for carrying out the duties of their office,
or on facts which are false, though not known so to be, are libellous. Post
Publishing Co. v. Maloney, 5o Ohio St. 71 (1893); Wood v. Boyle, 177
Pa. 620 (j896); Clifton v. Lange, io8 Iowa 472 (1899); Parsons v. Age-
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Herald Publishing Co., 6z So. 345 (Ala. 1913); Kutcher v. Post Printing
Co., 147 Pac. 517 (Wyo. 191S).
The comment must be fair and reasonable and must not go further
than the occasion warrants. Evening Post Co. v. Richardson, 113 Ky. 641
(19o2); Starks v. Comer, 67 So. 44o (Ala. 1914); Williams v. Hicks Print-
ing Co., x59 Wis. go (1914). Whether the comment is privileged is a
question of law for the court; whether it is fair and reasonable is a ques-
tion for the jury. Evening Post Co. v. Richardson, 113 Ky. 641 (1902);
Parsons v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., supra.
The principal case is a clear exposition of most of the principles of law
stated above, and is in accord with the great weight of authority on this
subject.
LIBEL-WORDs LiBELOUS Per Se-The defendant, a newspaper company,
published a story to the effect that the mayor of the city, having taken
offense at a certain lecture, ordered the city marshal to arrest the lecturer,
and the marshal having refused to do so, had caused the fire department
to be called out and water to be thrown upon the audience. Held: The
words were libelous per .c. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Pearce, 89 S. E. 759
(Ga. 1916.)
The rule is well settled that words which tend to expose a person to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule are actionable as being libelous per se.
Cohen v. N. Y. Times Co., 132 N. Y. S. i (19i1).
In respect to public officers, it is libelous per se to publish anything
which imputes want of integrity, or a lack of qualification, or a dereliction
of duty. Neeb v. Hope, ii Pa. 145 (1885); O'Shaughnessy v. N. Y.
Recorder Co., 58 Fed. 653 (1893); Kutcher v. Post Printing Co., 147 Pac.
517 (Wyo. igi5). But the libel must be published about the person while
he is in office. Edwards v. Howell, 32 N. C. 211 (1849). It must touch him
in respect to the office. Kinney v. Nash, 3 N. Y. 177 (849). And it must
impute the lack of some duty which he was bound to do. Westbrook v. N. Y.
Sun Ass'n, 6s N. Y. S. 399 (19oo). Of course, if the publication is libelous
per se without reference to the office, the holding of office at the time is
immaterial. Russel v. Anthony, 3o Am. Rep. 436 (Kan. 1879); Callahan
v. Ingram, 26 S. W. 1o2o (Mo. 1894).
Where the libeled person was a mayor, as in the principal case, it has
been held libelous per se to refer to him as an "imp of the devil," Price
v. Whitily, 50 Mo. 439 (1872), or to charge that he allowed a dive to remain
open. Kutcher v. Post Pub. Co., supra. On the other hand, it is not libelous
per se to charge a lack of duty on the part of a volunteer citizens' committee.
Dawson v. Baxter, 42 S. E. 456 (N. C. i92). Nor to publish that the mayor
was running the town without reference to council or the people. Denver v.
Montgomery, 132 Pac. 183 (Kan. 1913).
Where the publication charges something which is a usual incident of
politics, it will not be considered actionable. Lydiard v. Wingate, i55 N. W.
212 (Minn. 1915). Nor will the use of slang phrases, nor the appearance
of slight inaccuracies, make the publication libelous per se. Addington v.
Times Pub. Co., 70 South 784 (La. 1916).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY ARISING
OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF TIHE EMPLOYMENT-EFECT or PRE-EIsTING
D sEAsE-The claimant had been suffering from heart disease. The disease
was so accelerated by a muscular exertion during her work that she was
totally incapacitated. The same exertion would not have injured a normally
healthy person; nor would the character of the disease, acting alone or
progressing as it would under normal work, be sufficient to cause the dis-
ablement. field: Claimant suffered a personal injury arising out of and
in the course of the employment; she is therefore entitled to compensation
for total disability, nor is there to be any apportionment of the award on
account of the prior illness of the claimant. In re Madden, III N. E. 379
(Mass. 1916).
The case holds that the muscular exertion necessary in the work done
by the complainant was the contributing proximate cause of the injury.
Therefore, there is the necessary causal connection between the work and
the injury, for the injury to "arise out of and in the course of the employ-
ment." MeNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497 (19r3). The case is important in
that it holds that the full protection of the act is to be extended to all
employees, regardless of their physicil condition at the time of the "acci-
dent," provided that the work is the -proximate cause of the injury, which
may be but an acceleration of the pre-existing disease. The situation has
been productive of much discussion from the standpoint of the fundamental
jurisprudence of workmen's compensation acts. See "Consequences of Acci-
dents under Workmen's Compensation Laws," by P. Tecumseh Sherman, in
64 UNi. oF PENNA. L. REv. 417; and Carrol v. Stables Co., 96 Att. 208 (R. L
1916), annotated in 64 UNIv. or PENNA. L. REV. 624. Both Mr. Sherman's
article and the annotation contain citations of the leading cases and other
authorities.
MUcIPAL. CORIORATIONs-ToRTs-DuTy To ERECr BARRIERS ALocG
STREETs-A motor car plunged over a high embankment which .bordered a
city boulevard, there being no protecting railing of any sort. Held: The
municipal corporation was liable. Briglia v. City of St. Paul, zS8 N. W. 79S
(Minn. x916).
The general rule is well settled that a city is bound to maintain its
streets in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary use by erecting barriers,
etc. This duty is limited to care of the streets only. Hutchison v. Town
of Summerville, 66 S. C. 442 (19O3) ; Gingles v. City of Rock Island, 217
Ill. 185 (i9o5); Prather v. City of Spokane, 29 Wash. 549 (902). The
protection required tends more towards its adequacy as notice of a danger
than as an absolute protection. Stickney v. City of Salem, 85 Mass. 374
(1862); Brophy v. City of Chicago, 79 Ill. 277 (1875). This protection
must be properly placed. Kaner v. City of Detroit. 142 Mich. 331 (19o).
Where the risk requires barriers they must be maintained in effectual
condition. If, after proper erection of suitable barriers, they are removed
or destroyed by third persons, liability ceases unless the city knows or
should know by lapse of time that the barrier erected has become ineffectual.
Myers v. City of Kansas, 1o8 Mo. 480 (x89); Welsh v. City of Lansing,
III Mich. 589 (1897). Fox v. City of Chelsea, x7 Mass. 297 (898). So
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where the city knows that the barrier will be removed by trolley crews to
let trolleys pass, it will be responsible for the proper maintenance of the
barrier by watchman or otherwise, Prentiss v. City of Boston, 112 Mass.
43 (1873).
It has been held that a city is liable for dangerous defects in its streets
created under a permit to open the street unless the party so acting has
himself put up a reasonable protection of harriers, Blessington v. City of
Boston, 153 Mass. 409 (i8gi); Walker v. City of Ann Arbor, iii Mich. i
(ig&6). even where statute obliges such party to repair and protect. Hyde v.
City of Boston, j86 Mass. 115 (1904).
The rule laid down in Briglia v. City of St. Paul, supra, limiting duty
of municipal corporations to erect barriers to the actual street find support in
Ray v. City of St. Paul, 40 Minn. 458 (1889), and Seewald v. Schmidt, ct aL,
127 Minn. 375 (1914). but in Kinney v. City of Tekemah, 30 Neb. 6o5 (i89o);
Addison v. City of Elwood, _-6 Ind. App. 28 (icoi) ; Baker v. City of Chicago,
195 11. 54 (ioo) : Earl v. City of Cedar Rapids, 1-,6 Iowa 36t (igo5); Specs
v. City of Vincennes, 35 Ind. App. 389 (i9o5), the rule is broader and
includes dangerous localities adjacent to the street.
The duty only arises by statutory command and its icope is generally
limited by the statutes creating it. Sutton v. City of Snohomish, ix Wash.
24 (1895): Wentworth v. Pittsfield, 73 N. H. '359 0905).
There is a tendency in several jurisdictions to limit this duty to protect
street defects and dangers by barriers, danger lights, etc., to a minimum and
to decide as a matter of law that the risk was too slight to raise any duty,
or the protection afforded was adequate, wherever the evidence gives any
opportunity to so rule, Lineburg v. City of St. Paul, 71 Minn. 245 (1898);
Martin v. City of Chelsea, 175 Mass. 516 (09oo) ; Thins v. City of Vincennes,
28 Ind. App. 523 (19o2) ; Bohl v. City of Dell Rapids, x5 S. D. 6xg (IO2) ;
Watson v. City of Duluth, 128 Minn. 446 (1915). but see also Newman v.
City of Ann Arbor, r34 Mich. 29 (903).
PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSIoN-MISTAK AS TO BOUNDARY-In making
a conveyance, a grantor pointed out land as included in the deed when in
fact it was not. The grantee occupied all the land, intending to claim only
to the true boundary. Held: Title by adverse possession was acquired.
Pease v. Whitney, 98 Atl. 62 (N. H. x916).
There are two lines of decisions as to whether *one who holds land by
mistake, has adverse possession. The principal case is contra to the weight
of authority, that possession by mistake is not adverse. Preble v. Maine
Cent. R. R., 27 AtI. i49 (Me. i893) ;.Griffin v. Brown, 149 N. W. 833 (Iowa
1914). If, however, the intent is to hold the land at all events, the statute
runs. regardless of any mistake as to boundary. Wilson v. Husted, 59 Ark:
626 (1894). But the claim must be as broad as the possession. Dolittle v.
Bailey, 85 Iowa 398 (1892). In the absence of intention to hold adversely,
the presumption is that the claimant intended to hold to the true line only.
Tann v. Kellogg, 49 Ala. i8 (1871). The rule does not apply to the
grantees of persons who occupied by mistake part of their neighbor's land,
because it could not be supposed that they did not intend to claim the lands
they purchased. Otis v. Moulton, 2o Me. 2o5 (1841).
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The minority rule is that the possession and the claiming of the land
as one's own constitutes adverse possession regardless of the claimant's
guilt or innocence. French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439 (1g3i); Williams v.
Hewitt, 164 S. W. iig8 (Tenn. 1914). If, however, two adjoining land-
owners agree that a fence is not on the true line and that they will allow
the fence to stay for convenience, the possession is not adverse but permis-
sive. Russel v. Maloney, 39 Vt-.579 (1867); Small v. Hamlet, 24 Ky. 238
(1902).
All jur'sdictibns agree that if, by mistake one claims an estate less
than a fee, the statute will not run. Bond v. O'Gara, 58 N. E. 275 (Mass.
i9oo). A claim of a life estate, with a remainder in fee, is the claim of a
fee. Hanson v. Johnson, 5 Am. Rep. igg (Md. 1884).
The southern and western states favor the majority rule, Skauski v.
Novak, 146 Pac. i6o (Wash. i915); Mobile & G. R. Co. v. Rutherford, 63
So. "ioo3 (Ala. 1913), but see Jasperson v. Scharnikow, ISo Fed. 571 (Wash.
1907).
The early Pennsylvania cases followed the majority rule, Comegys v.
Carley, 3 Watts 280 (Pa. 1834) ; Brown v. McKinney, 9 Watts 565 (Pa. 184o),
but the later cases are contra. Kuhns v. Fennell, 3 Atl. 92o (Pa. 1885);
Culbertson v. Duncan, 13 Atl. 966 (Pa. 1888) ; Reiter v. McJunkin, 173 Pa.
82 (1896) ; Farr v. Mullen, 5 L. L N. 318 (Pa. 1899).
PUBLIC OFFIcER-B1BERY-A candidate for county judge promised in
his campaign that, if elected, he would accept less than the salary legally
due. There was no evidence that any voter was influenced by these prom-
ises. Held: The promises were illegal and disqualified the defendant from
holding the office. Prentiss v. Dittmer, I2 N. E. 1021 (Ohio i9i6).
The rule of the principal case .is firmly established by the eleven cases
found in which the question has arisen concerning such promises to accept
less than the legal salary. Gloucester Case, Reports of Controverted Elec-
tion Cases by Cushing, et aL., 97 (Mass. i8io) ; State ex rel. v. Purdy, 36
Wis. 213 (874), citing Gloucester case, supra; State ex rel. v. Church, 5
Ore. 375 (1875); Carrothers v. Russel, 53 Ia. 346 088o); State ex ref. v.
Collier, 72 Mo. 13 (188o); People ex re/. v. Thornton, 6o How. Pr. 457
(N. Y. 1881); State ex reL. v. Humphreys, 74 Lex. 466 (1889); State ex rel.
v. Elting, 29 Kan. 397 (1893); State ex rel. v. Bunnel, 131 Wis. 198 (1907);
Bush v. Head, 154 CaL 277 (igo8); Diehl v. Totten, i55 N. W. 74 (N. D.
1q15). The basic reason of these cases for declaring such promises illegal
is because the practice tends to giving the offices "not to those who are
most able to execute them but to those who are most able to pay for
them." Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113 (1834).
There is, however, a difference of opinion as to whether the promise
alone is sufficient to invalidate the election. Six cases, in accord with the
principal case, declared the defendant's election void. Gloucester Case;
Carrothers v. Russel; People ex rel. v. Thornton; State ex ref. v. Elting;
Bush v. Head; and Diehl v. Totten; supra. The other cases hold that in
order to disqualify the defendant it must be shown that it was the illegal
votes as influenced or induced by the promises which elected him. State
ex rel. v. Purdy; State ex rel. v. Church; State ex rcl. v. Collier; State cx
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tel. v. Humphries; State ex rel. v. Bunnel, supra, and People ex tel. v. Thorn-
ton, 25 Hun 456 (N. Y. 1881), reversing on this point People ex tel. v. Thorn-
ton, supra.
RAPE--COERCioN-THREAT OF ARREs--The prosecutrix testified that the
defendant, who intimated that he was an officer, threatened her with arrest
if she would not consent to the act of intercourse. It was uncertain whether
the threat was made before or after the act. Held: It was error not to
charge that the mere threat to arrest would not be a threat to use such
force and violence. State v. Cavanaugh, 158 Pac. 1053 (Cal. 1916).
It is well settled that to constitute the crime of rape, there must be the
use of force, and the act must be done without the consent, or against the
will, of the female. The force, however, need not be actual, but may be
constructive or implied; and constructive force is defined as acquiescence
gained through duress or fear. McNair v. State, 53 Ala. 453 (i875); Shep-
herd v. State, 33 So. 266 (Ala. 19o3). It has been held that the threat which
compels acquiescence must be a threat of death or bodily harm. Montoza v.
State, j85 S. W. 6 (Texas ix96). The female need not necessarily be under
the apprehension of death, in order to constitute the crime. Waller v. State,
4o Ala. 325 (z867). A threat of future harm is not sufficient to make the
consent void, it must be a threat of immediate persbnal injury. People v.
Crosby, x2o Pac. 44t (Cal. 1911).
It has been- held that rape may be committed without the use of
physical force or violence, but a charge which refers the submission to the
"force of surrounding circumstances" is too vague and indefinite. King v.
Commonwealth, 2o S. W. 224 (Ky. 1892). One court has said that the use
of the word "force" has reference solely to the will of the female, Darrell
v. Commonwealth, 88 S. W. io6o (Ky. x9o5), and the crime is rape if ac-
companied by an array of physical force, so that the female dared not
resist, even if the defendant lay no hand on her. Doyle v. State, 22 So. 272
(Fla. x897). Thus, it was held to be rape where a child just over fourteen
consented to intercourse with her father, at his command. State v. Dawson,
70 S. E. 721 (S. C. 1911).
TORTS-INJURY TO TRESPASSER-UNLICENSED AuToMonB-An unregis-
tered automobile was being driven on a public highway wnen, because of a
negligently maintained and defective bridge, it was wrecked and the owner
driving it injured. Held: The statute prohibits the use of an unregistered
automobile and therefore such use is a trespass against which towns are
not bound to keep the ways safe. McCarthy v. Inhabitants of Leeds, 98
Atl. 72 (Me. 1916).
Excepting the "attractive nuisance" or "turntable cases" doctrine, the
rule is well established that a person owes no duty towards trespassers or
wrongdoers except to refrain from wilful and wanton injury or active negli-
gence. Sweeney v. Old 'Colony and Newport Railroad, io Allen 368 (Mass.
z865); Bottum's Adm. v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370 (911); Shawnee v. Cheek, 142
Pac. 346 (Okla. x913) ; Wilmes v. Railway Co., 156 N. W. 877 (Ia. i916).
There is, however, authority for the rule that it is not a sufficient defense
to show merely that the plaintiff was a wrongdoer, trespasser, or violator
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of the law. Kerwacher v. Cleveland, etc., Railroad, 3 Ohio St. I72 (1854);
Norris v. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271 (1857); Isbell v. N. Y. & N. H. Railroad,
27 Conn. 393 (1858). See also Lovett v. Railroad Co., 9 Allen 557 (Mass.
1865).
The principle regarding trespassers is applied to the situation of the
principal case. The Massachusetts courts are in accord. Dudley v. Railway
Co., 202 Mass. 443 (s9o9). See also Tackett v. Taylor County, 123 Ia. 149
(i9o4). But the principle does not apply where the driver of the machine
is unlicensed. Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155 (i9iz).
Where, however, the statute does not prohibit the use of the highways
by unlicensed automobiles but merely provides a penalty, it is generally held
that there can be a recovery unless the defendant shows some causal con-
nection between the illegal act and the injury. Hemming v. New Haven, 82
Conn. 661 (igio); Railroad Co. v. Wier, 63 Fla. 69 (1912); Birmingham,
etc., Co. v. Aetna Cb., 184 Ala. 6oi (1913); Lockbridge v. Railway Co., 161
Ia. 74 (1916). Some courts, likewise, contra to the principal case, require
a causal connection between* the injury and the illegal act when the statute
expressly prohibits the use of unlicensed machines. Lindsay v. Cecchi, go
Atl.,523 (Del. ipzi); Hyde v. McCreery, 145 App. Div. 729 (N. Y. 19i1);
Armstead v. Loudensberry, 129 Minn 34 (1915). See also Crossen v. Rail-
way Co., 158 Ill. App. 42 (xgio), and Shaw v. Thielbahr, 8z N. J. L 23
(1911).
TORTS-LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENT FROM FIREWORKS AT A CELEBRAIoN-A
small child was seriously injured by the explosion of a bomb on his father's
premises where it had fallen, unexploded, during a fireworks display given
nearby. Held: The promoters of a display that may become a nuisance by
reason of the manner and place in which it is conducted are liable for re-
sulting personal injuries. Sroka v. Halliday, et al., 97 Ati. 965 (R. I. 19x6).
The law demands the highest degree of care in the custody of ex-
plosives. McAndrews v. Collerd; 42 N. J. Law i89 (i88o); Laflin-Rand
Powder Co. v. Tearney, 23 N. B. 389 (Ill. i8go) ; Rudder v. Koopman, 22 So.
boi (Ala. 1897), and is especially exacting as respects young children.
Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Shields, 24 N. E. 658 (Ohio I8go); Mattson v.
Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., zo4 N. W. 443 (Minn. i9o5); Wells, et al. v.
Gallagher, 39 S. 747 (Ala. i9o5). This requirement particularly applies
where explosives from a fireworks display fall, unexploded, upon public or
private grounds and -are permitted to remain there and be discharged by
children and persons unacquainted with their dangerous nature. Bianki v.
Greater American Exposition Co., et al., 92 N. W. 615 (Neb. x902).
Where children find unguarded explosives they are not guilty of con-
tributory negligence when injuries result. Powers v. Harlo.w, i9 N. W. 257
(Mich. 1884); Olson v. Gill Home Investment Co., xo8 Pac. 141 (Wash.
91o) ; contra, Afflick v. Bates, 43 Atl. 539 (R. I. x899), where the act of a
boy in exploding a cap found in an exposed tool chest was considered as the
proximate cause of the injury. Merely being present at and observing a
display of fireworks is not contributory negligence fin one injured by their
discharge. Bradley v. Andrews, 51 Vt. 530 (1879); Dowell v. Guthrie, 12
S. W. goo (Mo. x889); Colvin v. Peabody, 29 N. E. 59 (Mass. i89i).
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All persons setting off fireworks in a public street contrary to municipal
laws are responsible for injuries done to innocent persons and their prop-
erty. Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. N. Y. 218 (x859); Jenne v. Sutton, 43
N. J. Law 257 (1881); contra, with strong dissent, Scanlon v. Wedger, 3X
N. E. 642 (Mass. 1892), where voluntary spectators were denied recovery
for injuries caused by fireworks not negligently discharged.
Where the display is not unlawful, or a nuisance, per se, spectators in-
jured by bombs, falling rockets, etc., can recover for negligence of the pro-
moters in using improperly made explosives and in carelegsly and unsuitably
discharging them. Colvin v. Peabody, supra; Bianki v. Greater American
Exposition Co., et al., supra; Crowley v. Rochester Fireworks Co, 76 N. E.
470 (N. Y. i9o6) ; but see contra, Sebeck 4. Plattdeutsche Volksfest Verein,
124 Fed. zi (i9o3), where no care as to the quality of the explosives and
the manner of their discharge, but only precauiions as to distance of the
spectators from the discharging place, were considered necessary.
TORT-NECGLGENcF-THEATRE-A theatre patron, injured as a result of
the careless loading and handling of a pistol by a member of a traveling
company, brought suit against the owner of the theatre. Held: Such owner
is liable even though the actor was the servant of the manager of the
traveling company. Cox v. Coulston, 114 L. T. R. 599 (gxz6).
Although a theatre patron is merely a licensee, and the extent of the
rights conferred by a theatre ticket, are to be determined by the rules ap-
plicable to licenses generally. Collister v. Hayman,. i83 N. Y. Ct. of App.
250 (i9o5); Boswell v. Barnum-Bailey, 185 S. W. 692 (Tenn. x9x6). Yet
at such licensee, he is to be protected from harm while in the enjoyment
of this license. Sec. x24, J. A. Brackett's "Theatrical Law," p. 136. In
England, the proprietor of a music hall has been held responsible for the
acts of an independent performer, on the theory of an implied contract
that spectators should be safe. Welsh v. Canterburg-Paragon, 1o T. L. R.
478 (1894). And though the manager, or owner of a place of amusement,
is not an insurer of the safety of his patrons, yet his duty is to exercise
reasonable care to that end. Sebeck v. Plattdeusche Volkfest Verein, 64
N. J. L. 624 (igoo). New Theatre Co. v. Hartlove, 123 Md. 78 (1914).
Especially to protect against incidents arising from the production of a
play intrinsically dangerous. Plaskot v. Benton-Warren Agri. Soc., 89 N. E.
68 (Ind. igog). The fact that the exhibition-was by an independent con-
tractor does not relieve the proprietor from responsibility, if it were of
such a nature, likely to cause injury to a spectator, unless due precautions
to guard against harm were taken. Thompson v. Lowell St. Ry. Co., 17o
Mass. 577 (1898); Richmond Co. v. Moore's Adms., 94 Va. 493 (1897).
Such as the negligent operation of a spotlight. Thomas v. Springer, 134
N. Y. App. 64o (19o9). This has- been applied in those cases where the
proprietor of the theatre receives a percentage of the admissions; he is
responsible for the condition of all apparatus and devices used by the con-
cessionary. there being an implied representation on his part, that the instru-
ments used in the advertised amusement are reasonably safe. Texas State
Fair v. Britain, 118 Fed. 713 (Tex. 1902) ; Thornton v. Maine State AgrL
Soc., 97 Me. io8 (i9) ; Stickel v. Riverview Sharpshooters Park Co., 25o
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Ill. 452 (1911). In some cases the doctrine, res ipsa loquitur, hai been
applied and the duty of the manager has been carried to an extreme point.
Wodnik v. Luna Park Co., 125 Pac. 941 (Wash. 1912).
The holding in the principal case is followed in Pennsylvania. Fox v.
Dougherty, 2 W. N. C. 417 (Pa. 1876), and its application seems practically
universal. A good review of all the cases on the subject is cited in Hart-
mann v. Tennessee State Fair Ass'n, 183 S. W. 733 (Tenn.-rg16).
ToRTs-SmREr RAILW.Ys-DEGREE OF CARE NEcEssARY-Where a negli-
gent driver was struck in crossing the street car tracks it appeared that the
collision might have been avoided had the motorman brought the car under
control as soon as he saw the wagon start across the tracks. Held: The
street car company is liable. Stewart v. Metropolitan Street Railway Com-
pany, 188 S. W. ig8 (Mo. 1916).
It is the general rule that a street railway company is bound to exercise
ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collisions with vehicles or pedestrians
rightfully on its tracks, and to keep a lookout for persons who may be
approaching the track. Beers v. Housatonic R. R. Co., ig Conn. 566 (t849) ;
Baltimore Traction Co. v. Wallace, 77 Md. 435 (1893); Indianapolis Street
Ry. Co. v. Seerley, 35 Ind. App. 467 (i9o4); Rapp v. Transit Co., s9o Mo.
144 go5).
"Ordinary care" as used in these cases has been defined by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court as "that degree of care which men of ordinary
prudence and skill engaged in like work, would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances." Keefe v. Seattle Electric Co., 104 Pac. 774 (Wash. 909).
Consequently, it has been held, a greater degree of care is required
to prevent injuries to children than with regard to the safety of -adults.
Passamaneck's Admr. v. Louisville Ry. Co., 98 Ky. 195 (i895); Woeckrier
v. Erie Electric Motor Co., 176 Pa. 451 (1896). This also applies to crip-
ples and persons in peril from which they are unable to extricate them-
selves. Baltimore Traction Co. v. Wallace, 77 Md. 43s (1893), supra; South
Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Kinnare, 96 Ill. App. 210 (1go1). On the other
hand, the railway company owes no duty to a trespasser to look out for him
until his danger has actually been discovered, unless there is reason to
expect that there may be persons on the track. Levelsmeier v. St. Louis &
Suburban Ry. Co., 14 Mo. App. 412 (igos); Birmingham Ry., Light-&
Power Co. v. Jones, 153 Ala. 157 (1907). Where the negligencb of the
person injured was the cause of the injury, no recovery can be had. Graff
v. Detroit Citizens! R. Co., 109 Mich. 77 (1896); Brown v. Pittsburg, etc.,
Traction Co., 14 Pa. Super. Ct 594-
But under the doctrine of the "last clear chance" even though the
person injured was negligent, if the motorman by the exercise of ordinary
care after the danger is, or ought to have been, observed, might have
avoided the .collision, he is not precluded from recovery. Owenboro City
Ry. Co. v. Hill, 56 S. W. 21 (Ky. 1900); Indianapolis Street Ry. Co. v.
Seerley, 35 Ind. App. 467 (19o4), .supra; Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co.
v. Barnes, 8o Ark. 119 (xgo6). This doctrine also applies to trespassers.
Floyd v. Paducah Ry. & Light Co., 73 S. W. 112 (Ky. 1903).
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In some jurisdictions it is not sufficient that the motorman by the
exercise of reasonable care might have become aware of the dangerous
position of the party injured in time to a jijd striking him, but actual
knowledge is essential to relieve persons injured from the effects of their
own negligence. Johnson v. Stewart, 62 Ark. 164 (1896); Siek v. Toledo
Consolidated Ry. Co., i6o Ohio C. C. 393 (1898); Austin Dam & Suburban
Ry. Co. v. Goldstein, z8 Tex. Cir. App. (x88).
TRADE NAMEs-DEsCiP'TIvE NAEs-The manufacturer of a prepara-
tion called "malted milk" sought to enjoin the manufacture and sale of a
somewhat similar preparation called "Hedley's Malted Milk." Held:
"Malted milk" was descriptive and had never become distinctive of the
Horlick make. Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. Summerskill, 114 L. T. Rep.
484 (Eng. r916).
Any w.ords, letters, figures, marks, or devices, or combinations of any
of these, affixed to a commercial article and used primarily to indicate
origin or ownership is a valid trade-mark but there must be more than the
mere employment of the combination to designate quality or ingredients,
or to serve solely as a geographical name without any secondary significa-
tion. W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co, 62 Atl. 499 (Me. 19o5).
The test whether a word to the exclusive use of which a trader was or-
iginally entitled has become publici juri$, is whether its use by others is
calculated to deceive the public. Ford v. Foster, 27 L. T. Rep. 219 (Eng.
1872).
Words used adjectively or as laudatory epithets do not entitle the user
to a monopoly, e. g., "Cellular," Cellular Clothing Co. v. Maxton & Murray,
8o L. T. Rep. Sg (Eng. x899); "Flare Front," Rushmore v. Manhattan
Screw & Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939 (9o8); "Orlwoola," appealing more
to the ear than to the eye and not distinctive, Re H. N. Brock & Co., Ltd.,
ioi L T. Rep. 587 (Eng. igio) ; and "Perfection," Re Crossfields & Sons, Ltd.,
ioi L T. Rep. 87 (Eng. x9o). Some words when standing alone do not
indicate origin and manufacture tut in association with other words have
that effect and become trade names: "Crown," "Jamestown," Virginia Baking
Co. v. Southern Biscuit Works, 68 S. E. 261 (Va. x9io). Others of them-
selves are distinctive: "Stone Ale," Montgomery v. Thompson, ef at, 64 L
T. Rep. 748 (Eng. i8gi); "Yorkshire Relish," Birmingham Vinegar Brew-
ing Co. v. Powell, 76 L. T. Rep. 792 (Eng. 1897); "Sunshine Stoves," Read-
ing Stove Works, etc., v. S. M. Howes Co., 87 N. E. 751 (Mass. igo9);
"California Syrup of Figs," Re California Fig Syrup Co., Ltd., iox L. T.
Rep. 587 (Eng. 1910).
